Conclusion. Local Government Finance: The Challenges of the 21st Century by Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge & Smoke, Paul
Georgia State University
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Economics Faculty Publications Department of Economics
2011
Conclusion. Local Government Finance: The
Challenges of the 21st Century
Jorge Martinez-Vazquez
Georgia State University, jorgemartinez@gsu.edu
Paul Smoke
New York University, paul.smoke@nyu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_facpub
Part of the Economics Commons
This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Economics at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Economics Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more
information, please contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jorge Martinez and Paul Smoke. "Conclusion" in Local Government Finance: The Challenges of the 21st Century. United Cities and
Local Governments' Second Global Report on Decentralization and Local Democracy, Barcelona 2010.Edward Elgar, 2011.
Local Government Finance: 
The Challenges of the 21st Century 
Second Global Report on Decentralization 
and Local Democracy 
GOLD II 
2  0  1 0  
United Cities and Local Governments 
Cites et Gouvernements Locaux Unis 
Ciudades y Gobiernos Locales Unidos 
Edward Elgar 
Cheltenham, UK • Northampton, MA, USA 
DISCLAIMER 
"The terms used concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or 
area, or of its authorities, or concerning delimitation of its frontiers or 
boundaries, or regarding its economic system or degree of development do not 
necessarily reflect the opinion of United Cities and Local Governments. The 
analysis, conclusions and recommendations of this report do not necessary 
reflect the views of the all members of United Cities and Local Governments." 
United Cities and Local Governments 
Cites et Gouvernements Locaux Unis 
Ciudades y Gobiernos Locales Unidos 
Avinyo 15 
08002 Barcelona 
www.cities-localgovernments.org 
Design and Layout 
Proofreader 
Illustrations and graphics 
MIA BCN 
Vivian Yel a 
Gerard Fagot 
Foreword 
Editorial project 
Acknowledgments 
1. Introduction 
2. Africa 
3. Asia-Pacific 
4. Eurasia 
5. Europe 
6. Latin America 
?. Middle East and Western Asia 
8. North America 
9. Financing Metropolitan Areas 
10. Conclusion 
Annex 
Bibliography 
© United Cities and Local Governments 2011 
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a 
retrieval system ortransmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mecha­
nical or photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of the 
publisher. 
Published by 
Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 
The Lypiatts 
15 Lansdown Road 
Cheltenham 
Glos GL50 2JA 
UK 
Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. 
William Pratt House 
9 Dewey Court 
Northampton 
Massachusetts 01060 
A catalogue record forthis book 
is available from the British Library 
Library of Congress Control Number: 2011936418 
ISBN928 0 85293 926 0 (cased) 
Printed and bound by MPG Books Group, UK 

Overview 
Local governments around the world have 
become key public sector actors during the 
past two decades, and decentralization 
now ranks among the most common and 
consequential global reforms (See First 
GOLD Report on Decentralization and Local 
Democracy). This trend could ultimately be 
as influential as other major institutional 
transformations of the past century, such 
as decolonization in Africa and Asia or the 
transition from planned to market 
economies in the former Soviet Union, 
China, and elsewhere. Indeed, local 
governments have in many respects truly 
come of age. Their role is reinforced in 
global policy circles, including through 
major multilateral proclamations, such 
as the European Charter of Local 
Self-Government (1985) and the UN 
Habitat Guidelines on Decentralization and 
Reinforcement of Local Governments (2007). 
In many regions of the world decentraliza­
tion has enhanced the functions and auto­
nomy of local entities. Local governments 
play increasingly more critical roles in deli­
vering basic infrastructure services, such 
as roads, transportation and water, and so­
cial services, such as education and health. 
These developments have contributed in 
minor and major ways to the progressive 
deepening of local democracy, the allevia­
tion of internal regional tensions in conflict 
prone areas, the promotion of broader and 
deeper citizen participation in public 
affairs, and the overall strengthening and 
efficiency of the public sector. 
Decentralization has also generated a dramatic 
upsurge in expectations. Citizens look more to 
local governments for those public services that 
improve daily living conditions. Central 
governments depend on local governments to 
support priority development and poverty 
reduction goals. Private firms increasingly rely 
on local governments to deliver infrastructure 
and other services that support production and 
stimulate job creation. 
One of the most critical factors underlying 
the ability of local governments to meet 
the growing expectations placed on them is 
the quality of the architecture and 
operation of the intergovernmental fiscal 
system. This Second GOLD Report focuses 
on local government finance worldwide. 
Local government finance is important not 
only because the role and impact of local 
governments have dramatically increased, 
but also because this progress has recently 
been confronted by daunting challenges. 
The global economic and financial crisis that 
emerged in 2008 —the most significant crisis 
since the Great Depression— has imposed 
major financial constraints on local 
governments in many countries. Equally 
important, central authorities in some 
countries have responded to the crisis by 
taking recentralization measures to deal with 
their own fiscal problems and increasing 
control over local governments. It is too early 
to say whether these actions represent a 
durable change in the decentralization trend, 
but they clearly pose immediate challenges to 
the viability and effectiveness of local 
governments. Resource constraints during a 
period of greater responsibility and need pose 
obvious threats, but so does the damaging 
curtailment of local government autonomy, 
which is a necessary condition for the full rea­
lization of the promise of decentralization. 
Beyond the impact of the global financial crisis, 
local governments are confronted with other 
significant structural challenges. As substantial 
urbanization continues unabated in some parts 
of the world, public service demands are 
growing faster than many local governments 
can keep up with. New needs are also arising as 
a result of an emerging understanding of the 
onerous implications of global environmental 
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challenges, as well as from major demographic 
changes, such as the increasing number of the 
elderly in some countries and the explosion of 
youth as a share of the population in others. 
These challenges, however, also present 
opportunities to strengthen and boldly reinvent 
the role of local governments. They are often in 
a unique position of strength to deal with 
pressing local problems, the solutions to which 
have important national consequences. 
The preceding regional chapters document 
strengths and weaknesses of local government 
fiscal frameworks in different parts of the world 
and examine the capacity of local governments 
to mobilize resources and manage 
expenditures. The chapters also assess 
intergovernmental relations and developments 
in governance, such as broader and deeper 
citizen participation in local planning and bud­
geting. This chapter summarizes key 
challenges and issues discussed in the 
preceding regional chapters, and points to 
possible broad-based policy solutions that 
could both alleviate problems and weaknesses 
experienced to date and help to improve overall 
local government performance. 
The next section outlines basic contextual 
factors that affect fiscal decentralization 
worldwide. This is followed by a summary of 
recent influential trends, experiences, and 
policy issues. Building on the review of fiscal 
decentralization parameters outlined in the 
introduction and discussed in the regional 
chapters, common and noteworthy local 
government finance issues and challenges are 
considered. Finally, the chapter closes with 
recommendations and concluding thoughts on 
the way forward in local finance reform and the 
next steps for UCLG. 
The Context of Reform: Diversity, 
Politics and Change 
The potential for local governments to serve as 
full partners in managing public functions and 
to contribute to local governance and improved 
service delivery remains a promising, but only 
partially fulfilled process in many countries. To 
some extent this should be expected, as 
decentralization occurs under different 
circumstances, is subject to powerful political 
forces, and requires some minimum capacity to 
be effective. Even in the most conducive 
environments, decentralization is a highly 
dynamic process that demands ongoing 
adaptation to evolving economic, social and 
political conditions. 
Understanding Diversity 
As highlighted in the introductory chapter, 
countries have been subject to different 
historical influences, so they are building 
from diverse institutional and governance 
traditions. This includes their experiences 
with and inclinations towards decentra­
lization, as well as their ability to absorb 
decentralization reforms. The role of local 
governments in public finance varies 
considerably across regions (Figure 10.1 & 
Table 10.1), and there are also large 
differences within regions. An important 
implication of these various differences is 
that desired local finance reforms vary 
considerably across regions and countries. 
Clearly, the reforms needed to strengthen 
local finances differ between countries that 
have a long tradition with decentralization 
and those with a shorter history of relevant 
experience. 
Local government finance is prospering in 
much of Europe, North America, and parts of 
East Asia and the Pacific (Korea, Japan, 
Australia, New Zealand). It remains at an 
early stage in some regions, such as the 
Middle East & Western Asia, where most local 
governments are deconcentrated units of the 
central government with limited autonomy. 
South Asia has a recent tradition of 
democracy, but local governments face 
controls by higher level governments. In Latin 
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Note: while local 
expenditures as a 
proportion of public 
expenditure may be 
relatively high in East Asia, 
Eurasia, and South Asia this 
does not necessarily mean 
that local goverments have 
autonomous control over 
spending, which is an 
important aspect of 
decentralization 
(devolution). 
The Comparative Fiscal Role of Local Government: Expenditure and Revenue as a Percentage 
of General Government Expenditure and Revenue 
Europe Eurasia . 
North America . I k - .  East Asia 
.O 
40 Africa 
20 
£•1 South Asia 
MEWA 
South East Asia 
Latin America 
expenditure 
revenue 
Source: Data from Table 10.1 
The Comoarative Role of Local Government 
Local expenditures as percentage 
of total revenues 
Local expenditure as percentage 
oAotal expenditures 
Africa 3.2 7.9 
(3.6) (6.8) 
Asia 
South Asia 1.5 16.0 
(0.9) (0.9) 
East Asia 20.0 40.0 
(0.3) (0.3) 
South-East Asia 5.3 15.5 
(0.8) (0.6) 
Eurasia N.A. 26.5 
(15.1) 
Europe (2008) 13.0 23.9 
(07) (0.5) 
Latin America 4.0 11.1 
(4.5) (73) 
Middle East 8t Western Asia N.A. 4.6 
(17) 
North America 12.8 26.8 
(0.6) 
Notes: Coefficient of variation in parentheses. The means include: Africa: Benin, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. South Asia: Bangladesh, India, Pakistan; East Asia: China, 
Japan, Korea; South -East Asia: Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand. Eurasia: Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine. 
Europe: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Rep., Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Rep., Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Iceland, Norway, 
Switzerland; Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru. Middle East and 
Western Asia: Bahrain, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Palestine, Yemen. North America: Canada, U.S.A. 
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America and Eurasia, local finances are 
generally improving, but still face challenges 
associated with past centralized traditions. 
China and most of Southeast Asia have made 
progress, but intergovernmental fiscal 
relations are unevenly developed and still 
experience significant challenges. African 
local governments are rarely well 
empowered, but there are hopeful advances, 
especially in some Anglophone countries, 
such as South Africa or Tanzania. 
One of the critical inferences emerging 
from the diversity of local government 
systems is that there is a need for diverse 
approaches to deal with fiscal challenges, 
even those that are relatively common. 
There is no magic formula to ensure that 
local government systems will function 
effectively. The road to success requires 
consistent and appropriately sequenced 
application of basic local public finance 
principles outlined in the introductory 
chapter. These are relatively few, and they 
leave adequate flexibility for each country 
to structure its intergovernmental finance 
system to fit its history and national goals. 
Respondingto Political Reality 
Decentralization is an intensely political process 
since it involves the central government 
assigning powers and granting autonomy to 
local governments. While political forces can 
often open the door to decentralization, as 
discussed throughout this report, they can also 
pose challenges. These include reluctance of 
central politicians to devolve powers to local 
governments for fear of losing control, the 
opposition of central bureaucrats whose 
institutional and personal goals conflict with 
decentralization, or resistance to legally 
mandated decentralization reforms during 
implementation from elites and pre-existing 
deconcentrated agencies. At the local level, local 
politicians can undermine decentralization if 
they are not sufficiently accountable to their 
constituents. These political realities must be 
understood and responded to if decentralization 
is to be effective and prosper. 
Developing Capacity 
Effective local governments require admin­
istrative capacity. Local government capacity 
can be an important constraint, particularly in 
developing countries. At times, perhaps 
somewhat paradoxically, decentralization 
underperforms because of weak central 
institutions, either due to political instability or a 
lack of control of basic functions of government, 
such as unified tax administration or treasury 
and budget implementation controls. If decen­
tralization is to meet its promise, capacity 
constraints and their consequences must be 
recognized and efforts to develop appropriate 
capacities need to be adopted. 
Adapting to Change 
Conditions and motivations for decentralization 
change, sometimes rapidly and dramatically. 
These changes can be relatively routine, such 
as the adoption of new legislation or the 
turnover of a government power after an 
election. They can also be momentous, such as 
a major political shift or a sudden economic and 
financial crisis. Local government policies and 
systems need to respond effectively to these 
changes, and adapt as necessary to shifting 
circumstances. At the same time, the 2008 
global financial crisis showed that adapting to 
shifting circumstances can also damage local 
governments. Local governments and their 
advocates must be vigilant and be prepared to 
defend their legitimate interests when they 
come under threat. 
Broad Policy Trends and Issues 
Before reviewing major findings on local 
government finance, it is important to 
contextualize those findings by noting some 
broader trends and common decentralization 
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issues the report shows can affect local fiscal 
performance. Some of these are experienced 
globally, while others are particularly relevant 
in certain regions or some subset of countries 
across regions. 
Global Crisis 
The financial and economic crisis noted above is 
affecting local governments globally. Emerging 
countries of Asia and some in Latin America have 
been less impacted, but others have suffered 
drastic effects. In March 2010, for example, the 
Greek government reduced by decree the 
number of local governments from 1,034 to 355 
in order to save an estimated 1.2 billion euros 
annually. 
The pains of fiscal adjustment due to the crisis 
are being strongly felt by local governments in all 
the continents. In a number of countries in 
Africa, Eurasia, and Latin America, central 
governments have cut transfers or introduced 
recentralization measures. In some regions, the 
effects of the crisis simply compound the effects 
of existing challenges. In Africa, for example, 
trade liberalization and fiscal transition, and in 
less developed countries more generally, poverty 
and informality have long presented challenges 
for public finance in general and local 
governments in particular. 
Even in the most advanced countries, 
stabilization policies to reduce public 
indebtedness, such as those being adopted in 
Europe and North America, are deeply impacting 
local finances. Local governments in many of 
those countries fear that a disproportionate 
share of the costs of further fiscal consolidation 
will fall on them in the form of cuts in 
intergovernmental transfers, restrictions on local 
credit, and other austerity measures. 
The financial and economic crisis is not the only 
global crisis with relevance for local 
governments. Financing climate change 
mitigation policies and the investments required 
for the associated risk management would 
considerably increase the resource needs of local 
governments worldwide. The financial 
implications for local governments of the 
response to environmental challenges are only 
beginning to be understood. 
Partial or Interrupted Decentralization 
Reform 
The global crisis provides one example of how 
decentralization can be stalled or reversed, but 
this is a more general problem taking different 
forms as evidenced in the regional chapters. 
Fiscal decentralization frameworks involve 
complex systems with many interrelated 
components, and some are easier to implement 
or politically more feasible than others. Thus, 
some local finance systems are only partially 
designed (relative to best practice principles) 
and some are only partially implemented even if 
they are mandated in the legal framework 
design. 
If only certain elements of the system are 
implemented or partially implemented, 
problems can arise because of the 
interdependencies involved. Deficiencies with 
one component often undermine the ability of 
the overall system to function effectively. For 
example, lack of clarity with functional 
assignment can lead to uncertainty regarding 
the financial needs of local governments. 
Similarly, problems with the design and 
implementation of intergovernmental transfer 
systems can compromise incentives and 
capacities for local service delivery, local 
revenue generation, and local borrowing. 
Among the most pervasive and damaging 
instances of incomplete decentralization is the 
assignment of too few revenues to finance 
assigned functions. At a global scale, very few 
countries escape dealing with major gaps 
between local expenditure and local revenues. 
This can result from a flaw in system design, 
but revenue inadequacy tends to occur for 
United Cities and Local Governments 
political or capacity reasons even in countries 
where constitutional or legal provisions prohibit 
unfunded local government mandates. The 
problem tends to be more significant in some 
regions. African countries, for example, generally 
have much less decentralization of revenues 
than of expenditures, leading to particularly 
severe revenue-expenditure gaps. 
Demographic Shifts 
UCLG. 2007. UCLG 
Policy Paper on Local 
Finance. UCLG. 
World Bank (2005) 
estimated the 
investment needs in 
public infrastructure 
in developing 
countries, amounting 
to 600 billion USD 
per year over the 
next 25 years. 
However, these 
figures include all 
public 
infrastructures, 
whether national 
(energy, 
communications and 
information 
technology, 
transport, water and 
sanitation, etc.) or 
urban (local roads, 
local water supply, 
and sanitation, waste 
disposals, schools, 
street lighting...). 
(World Bank. 2005. 
Infrastructure and 
the World Bank: A 
progress report. The 
World Bank). The 
UCLG Committee on 
Local Finance 
estimated one third 
of this amount, i.e. 
0.4 percent of World 
GDP, needs to be 
channeled to urban 
infrastructure 
(UCLG. 2007. UCLG 
Policy Paper on Local 
Finance. UCLG). 
Many European countries are confronted with 
the challenge of coping with the effects on 
public finances of a rapidly ageing population 
and the need to integrate immigrants into the 
labor market and society at large. The ageing 
population challenge is also relevant in several 
countries in Asia, such as China and Japan, and 
in Eurasia, such as Russia and Ukraine. In some 
developing countries, the growth of youth as a 
share of population poses different types of 
service challenges that also have serious 
financial implications. 
Rapidly increasing urbanization, particularly 
in many of the developing countries of 
Africa, Asia, and Latin America, continues to 
create demand for public services and 
infrastructure that requires a huge volume 
of resources. The needs are even larger if 
investments for climate change adaptation 
are included. Given available information on 
maintenance and development costs of urban 
investments, it would seem reasonable to 
expect a need for about 200 billion USD per 
year over the next 25 years for the 
developing countries alone1 ; this represents 
only one-third of the total spending need for 
total public infrastructure spending estimated 
by the World Bank.2 
Jurisdictional Fragmentation 
Fragmentation is a major issue for many 
countries in most regions of the world. In many 
countries the appropriate structure and size of 
local governments is an ongoing debate. Small 
local governments cannot independently take 
advantage of economies of scale in the delivery 
of some services, resulting in higher costs. 
Smaller local governments, however, generally 
provide a stronger political connection to 
citizens and may be better able to respond to 
local demands. Getting the right balance, e.g. 
by maintaining smaller local governments 
but providing mechanisms for cooperative 
arrangements among them and links to higher 
levels for large scale services, is a critical 
challenge in many counties. 
Thailand has more than 7,500 bottom tier local 
governments with an average population of 
less than 10 000, and there are concerns that 
these are too small for service delivery. In 
some cases, such as Uganda or Dominican 
Republic, new local governments are being 
constantly created, diluting the capacity of 
local governments that were only recently 
empowered. In a number of countries perverse 
incentives, such as offering equal lump sum 
transfers to all local governments regardless of 
size, create incentives for further jurisdictional 
fragmentation. 
On the other hand, in countries such as France 
(with 36,600 local governments), citizens 
strongly identify with smaller local governments 
(communes). These are said to bring 
greater representation and accountability, thus 
potentially balancing the additional costs 
represented by the inability to realize economies 
of scale, particularly if the latter can be realized 
by creating cooperative arrangements among 
the smaller units. When local governments in 
South Africa were substantially consolidated in 
2002, some analysts expressed concern 
that the new larger, more fiscally viable local 
governments had damaged political connectivity 
to citizens in some areas. 
Deconcentration and Devolution 
Devolution of spending and taxing powers to 
autonomous local governments is generally 
Second Global Report on Decentralization and Local Democracy. 
GOLD 2010 
held up as the standard for decentralization, 
but even some countries with elected local 
councils maintain deconcentrated administration. 
In Kenya, for example, district administrations 
exist in the same territory as elected county 
councils. There is little clarity with respect to 
their distinct functions, sometimes resulting in 
service redundancy or gaps (although this 
situation should be corrected by forthcoming 
reforms based on the 2010 constitution). 
In other cases, empowered local governments 
have not been created. In the MEWA region, for 
example, deconcentrated local administration 
prevails except in Turkey and Palestine. Similar 
situations can be found in countries in other 
regions, such as Egypt, Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
Thailand, and Kazakhstan. The use of local 
governments as deconcentrated units of the 
central administration leaves unexploited 
efficiency gains in the delivery of public services 
that are achievable with devolved systems by 
better matching the needs and preferences of 
local residents and making local officials more 
accountable to citizens. 
Intermediate Governments in Federal 
and Hierarchical Systems 
While a federal country is often associated with 
high fiscal decentralization, many federal 
constitutions do not recognize directly the right 
of local entities to self government. Instead, 
they empower states or other intermediate 
governments to establish fiscal relationships 
with local governments. This approach has led 
to considerable fiscal powers for local govern­
ments in Brazil, Canada, South Africa, and the 
United States. 
In other cases, such as Argentina, Australia, 
India, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, and 
Russia, local governments enjoy (often 
considerably) less fiscal autonomy even 
than those in some unitary countries with 
more centralized traditions. Depriving large 
populous countries like India or Pakistan (in 
the latter local authorities were suspended 
in 2009 by agreement between federal and 
provincial authorities) of accountable local 
governments diminishes their chances for 
attaining the potential benefits of 
decentralization. Limited authority for local 
governments is also present in unitary 
systems with strong hierarchical links 
between intermediate and local tiers of 
governments, such as China or Vietnam. 
The Role of International Development 
Agencies 
International development agencies often 
create challenges for the very developing 
countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America 
that they are supposed to be assisting 
through support for decentralization and local 
government reforms. There are various issues 
in this regard, but two are particularly 
important. First, these agencies have often 
pushed particular types of reforms, sometimes 
based on particular objectives of the agencies 
or simply what has worked in other countries. 
As a result, in some cases, the reforms being 
promoted have been inappropriate for recipient 
countries or have proven unsustainable 
because there is no strong national ownership. 
Second, the donors have commonly created 
parallel mechanisms to implement 
programs that support the financing and 
delivery of local services because of con­
cerns about low local administrative capa­
city, corruption, and other institutional 
weaknesses in the host country. These 
mechanisms can be based at higher levels 
or at local levels, but in either case they 
bypass the regular decision-making and 
resource management procedures of local 
governments. They can improve service 
delivery and may be appropriate in some 
form at early stages of decentralization 
when local governments are weak, but they 
ultimately undermine the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of local governments unless 
United Cities and Local Governments 
the systems and procedures they use are 
adapted and institutionalized into regular 
government operations. 
Local Government Finance: 
Main Issues and Challenges 
As outlined in the introduction of the report, 
several key aspects of fiscal systems need 
to be in place and meet certain basic 
principles for local governments to perform 
effectively. These include expenditure 
assignments and management; local own 
source (autonomous) revenues; properly 
structured intergovernmental transfers; and, 
where appropriate, access to borrowing and 
other alternatives to mobilize resources for 
development expenditures. This section 
outlines key issues and challenges identified in 
the regional chapters with respect to each of 
these issues. 
The emphasis in this section is on identifying 
problems and challenges that require attention, 
but it is important to acknowledge, as noted in 
the Introduction and some regional chapters, 
that there have been very significant 
improvements in local finance over the 
past decades in many developed and also 
developing countries. These improvements 
range from increased efficiency in public 
expenditures to greater revenue mobilization, 
and to innovations in public management, such 
as the more general adoption of the type of 
participatory budgeting that began in Latin 
America. 
Expenditure Assignment and Management 
A clear assignment of responsibilities and 
explicit methodologies to translate expenditure 
responsibilities into financial needs are 
fundamental for local finance. Deficiencies on 
this front weaken local governments and 
undermine the rest of the local fiscal 
framework. The challenges commonly fall under 
a number of categories outlined below. 
Clarity in expenditure assignment: Insufficient 
clarity occurs in many regions, particularly in 
developing countries in Africa, Asia, Eurasia, 
and Latin America. This results from poorly 
drafted laws and conflicts between 
decentralization laws and sectoral laws 
regarding specific services. Sectoral 
responsibilities may continue to be 
implemented by line ministries without 
coordination or in competition with local 
governments, duplicating efforts by keeping 
deconcentrated offices and staff at pre-
decentralization levels; this is a common 
occurrence, for example, in African and Latin 
American countries. The ambiguity of 
expenditure assignments can be more severe 
where there are more levels of government, as 
in China, and in federations where intermediate 
levels have significant but inadequately defined 
control over local governments under their 
jurisdiction, such as in the case of India. A 
related institutional issue in some countries, such 
as Australia and Argentina, is whether local 
governments should obtain separate legal 
status from their intermediate level governments, 
provinces, or states. 
Suitability of and compliance with expendi­
ture assignment: In some cases central 
authorities still play an unwarranted role in 
the delivery of basic local services, 
sometimes contrary to decentralization law. 
This can result in levels and types of services 
that differ from those desired by local people. 
In other cases, services with benefit spillovers 
(affecting people of jurisdictions beyond 
direct beneficiaries) or a heavy focus on 
redistribution lack coordination of tasks with 
higher levels of government; this can result in 
insufficient or uneven provision of services. 
This happens, for example, in China, which 
assigns responsibility for social security and 
public pensions to local governments. 
Funding expenditure mandates: Lack of clarity 
in functional assignment creates room for cost 
shifting among levels of government, often 
Second Global Report on Decentralization and Local Democracy. 
GOLD 2010 V 
319 
through unfunded local expenditure 
mandates that can be can be extremely 
burdensome. These can involve requiring 
local governments to deliver specific services, 
use particular delivery approaches, or meet 
certain input or output standards in service 
delivery. This is a common occurrence 
among developing and developed countries. 
Sometimes such mandates may involve 
services that local governments are not 
required to provide under local government 
legislation. 
Budget approval and control by higher level 
authorities: The central or regional autho­
rities assist with and closely oversee —and 
ultimately may even approve— the budgets 
voted on by local elected councils in many 
countries, particularly in Africa, Asia, Eurasia, 
Latin America, and MEWA regions. This 
practice of ex-ante control weakens the 
budgetary autonomy of local authorities. 
Incentives for local expenditure efficiency: 
Particularly in developing countries, local 
government spending quality is often low in 
terms of the outcomes produced relative to 
the costs incurred. This is partly attributable 
to resource constraints and the often-
excessive administrative shares of the local 
government budget. But other factors noted 
above (lack of clarity in functional 
assignments, unfunded mandates, etc.) 
and below (conditional transfers and low 
revenue autonomy) also undermine local 
accountability and incentives to use resources 
efficiently. 
Local Revenue Generation/Autonomy 
Local revenue generation and autonomy are 
critical for local governments to be able to 
meet their expenditure responsibilities in an 
accountable and efficient way. Yet there are 
very few countries in the world that so far have 
provided local governments with the means 
and autonomy needed to raise adequate 
revenues. This problem is manifested in various 
ways related to the design and use of local 
revenue systems. 
Vertical fiscal imbalances: The transfer of ex­
penditure responsibilities to local govern­
ments has often not been accompanied by 
devolution of corresponding revenue sources 
(including intergovernmental transfers, which 
are discussed below). As noted above, local 
government revenues in many regions play a 
minor role in national public budgets. This has 
resulted in increasing financial pressures on 
the local government expenditure, and even 
where resources are more adequate, greater 
local government dependence on central 
transfers. 
Revenue autonomy: Autonomy is highly 
constrained in most of Africa, Asia, and the 
Middle East and West Asia. The situation is 
better in Eurasia and Latin America, but not 
uniformly. Local governments have limited or 
no authority to introduce new taxes, and to 
decide on some or all tax rates, fees, and 
user charges. Even some decentralized 
countries, such as Australia, limit local revenue 
autonomy. A number of prominent attempts to 
enhance tax autonomy and reduce transfer 
dependence, such as recent "Trinity Reforms" 
in Japan, have only partially succeeded. 
Revenue autonomy is stronger, but not without 
challenges, in advanced economies of Western 
Europe and North America. 
Property taxation challenges: The property tax 
is the most commonly recommended and 
globally used local government tax, but its 
significant revenue potential often remains 
unrealized. On average developing countries 
raise 0.5 percent of GDP from property tax 
compared to two percent in developed 
countries. This is partly because the tax is 
unpopular— even in some developed countries 
where it plays a significant role (U.S., Canada, 
U.K.), citizen opposition has been strong. 
In addition, it is difficult and expensive to 
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administer, all the more so in many developing 
countries without well defined property 
registers, with sizable informal areas, and with 
weaker local capacity for value assessments, 
enforcement, and collection. 
Diversification of the local tax base: Local tax 
bases are often narrow, especially given the 
problems with heavy reliance on the property 
tax. A number of countries in Europe and 
North America use local personal income 
taxes. A local piggyback, flat-rate personal 
income tax is collected with the national 
income tax in Nordic countries and some 
transition economies of Central and Eastern 
Europe. In Latin America, several countries, 
such as Brazil, Chile, and Colombia use 
various types of local business taxation. Local 
sales taxes are used in a few countries, 
notably in Canada, with the presence of a 
national VAT, and in the United States, where 
there is no VAT. Poor diversification of the 
local tax base is often aggravated by the lack 
of flexibility to adapt to evolving circumstan­
ces (for example, growth in the service 
sector). Inelasticity (lack of revenue response 
to changes in the economic base) of many 
local taxes over time is problematic as 
progressively increasing demand for services 
and costs outstrip revenue growth. In a 
number of African countries (Tanzania, 
Uganda, and Zambia) some viable local taxes 
have been recently eliminated and partially 
replaced with transfers, and many countries, 
prominently Korea, suffer from a proliferation 
of "nuisance taxes" that yield low revenues 
relative to collection costs. 
Fees and user charges: Local governments 
need to establish fees for services, ideally on a 
cost-recovery basis where this is feasible. In 
Canada and the U.S., local governments 
generate one-quarter of their own revenues 
with fees and charges, which is all the more 
significant given their broad high levels of local 
own tax revenue. The situation is very different 
in many developing countries. In some African 
countries, such as Algeria, Benin, Egypt and 
Tunisia, local governments have no authority to 
set local fees and charges. 
Politics of local revenues: Political barriers to 
local revenue generation can be seen in both 
the reluctance of local government to raise 
taxes (for instance, in some EU countries) as 
well as in the limitations imposed on local 
revenue generation legislated by higher levels 
of government or citizen referendums (in many 
states in the U.S.). To some extent these phe­
nomena result from poor taxpayer education 
and general expectations by citizens for more 
and better quality services with the same or 
lower taxes. 
Local and central roles in revenue collection: 
International practice varies as countries 
seek to maximize revenues while minimizing 
administration and compliance costs 
(which favor a role for higher levels in 
administration and enforcement) and 
maximizing local accountability and local 
information advantages (which favor local 
governments' direct involvement in 
administration and enforcement). Although 
centralized mechanisms are in principle 
desirable for certain taxes, central agencies 
do not in some regions, including MEWA and 
West Africa, transfer the resources they 
collect to local governments in a timely 
manner. The lack of incentives for central tax 
authorities to collect local revenues can also 
be a problem. The experience of a variety of 
countries (Costa Rica, Jordan, and some 
countries in Eurasia) shows significant increases 
in revenue collections when tax administration 
responsibilities are transferred from central to 
local authorities. 
Intergovernmental Transfers 
A properly structured system of intergovern­
mental transfers is a critical component of a 
local finance system. The use of transfers, 
however, faces a number of challenges that are 
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dealt with in different ways and to varying 
degrees across regions and countries. 
Appropriate and stable revenue sharing: Most 
countries share some central taxes with local 
governments, an arrangement that is simple 
and has high revenue potential. This can be a 
partial solution to vertical imbalances, but 
shared revenues suffer from various 
constraints. Revenue sharing on a derivation 
basis can be seen as a stimulus for local 
economic activity, but it can also reinforce 
horizontal disparities and leads to higher 
volatility of local revenues. Particularly in 
developing countries, the amounts shared may 
be uncertain or lack transparency, making long 
term planning difficult for local governments. 
This is the case in a number of West African 
countries, where central governments withhold 
for their own purposes or delay resources to 
which local governments are entitled. Perhaps 
most importantly, substantial revenue sharing 
can create perverse incentives for local revenue 
generation, undermining both local autonomy 
and the accountability of local governments to 
their constituents. 
Horizontal fiscal imbalances: Despite the often 
significant differences across local governments 
in expenditure needs and the ability to finance 
them, many countries lack effective equalization 
grants. In Africa, just a few countries (Morocco 
and South Africa) have introduced them, and in 
MEWA there are none. The situation is a little 
better in Latin America, where a few countries 
(e.g. Brazil and Chile) use explicit equalization 
schemes, although more countries in the region 
employ only limited redistribution elements in 
revenue sharing schemes. Some Asian countries 
use equalization transfers (e.g. Australia, 
Indonesia, Japan), while others virtually ignore 
fiscal disparities (e.g. China, India, Philippines, 
New Zealand). Equalization grants are common 
in Eurasia, Europe, and North America (except at 
the federal level in the United States), but with 
varying effectiveness. Some Eurasian countries 
have not used transparent methodologies for 
equalization transfers, although the situation is 
improving. 
Equalization transfer design: Where equalization 
schemes exist, they often present problems; for 
example, (1) only differences in fiscal capacity or 
expenditure needs, instead of both, are 
considered; (2) actual revenues, instead of fiscal 
capacity, are measured, creating disincentives 
for local revenue mobilization; (3) the pool of 
funds are not stable or well defined, or (4) the 
use of funds is subject to rigid conditions that in 
effect make the equalization grants, which are 
normally general purpose grants without use 
restrictions, into conditional transfers. In 
federal countries, such as Australia, there are 
issues regarding how second tier governments 
(the states) interpret federal policies regarding 
equalization. 
Conditional transfer design: Conditional grants 
from upper level governments are a key 
element of local fiscal frameworks. Such 
grants can (1) promote national standards 
and goals in the provision of important 
services that have been decentralized, for 
example, some aspects of education and 
health; (2) address inter-jurisdictional ex­
ternalities with respect to, for example, 
environmental concerns; or (3) support local 
government infrastructure investments. 
Conditional or earmarked grants exist in many 
countries, especially for capital infrastructure 
purposes. However, in certain regions, such as 
Eurasia, conditional grants are not well 
developed. In other countries, such as Egypt, 
Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda, conditional 
transfers excessively dominate total transfers. 
Several problems are often associated with this 
type of grant, including their number and com­
plexity, which impose high compliance costs on 
local governments; lack of transparency, 
stability or timeliness; and sometimes political 
manipulation. In addition, excessive reliance on 
conditional grants can overly constrain local 
government autonomy and move their focus 
from local to national priorities, potentially 
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reducing their own comparative advantage in 
focusing on local needs. 
Performance based grants. A relatively recent 
innovation in the field of transfers has been the 
introduction of performance based transfers in 
some African and Asian countries with support 
from international organizations. Performance 
based grants condition the transfer of funds to 
meeting certain standards and objectives, 
generally leaving local governments to decide 
how best to use the funds. This type of transfer 
combines the flexibility of unconditional grants 
with an unconventional form of conditionality. 
On the downside, these transfers may privilege 
jurisdictions with greater administrative 
capacity, and they may suffer from the 
problems associated with voucher programs. 
Thus far they have been used more to promote 
compliance with financial and administrative 
management procedures than to improve 
service delivery outcomes. It is too early to 
definitively judge the effectiveness of 
performance based transfers but they are a 
promising mechanism and further trials are 
certainly desirable. 
Local Government Borrowing and Access 
to Financial Markets 
Perhaps the most neglected aspect of local 
government finance in many regions of the world 
is borrowing. In the context of the rapid 
urbanization discussed earlier, especially 
developing countries in Africa and Asia, the need 
for infrastructure investment is paramount. In 
this context, borrowing, with the 
intergenerational equity that it entails, is 
potentially an important means to finance longer 
term investments. At the same time, there are 
multiple factors that need to be considered. 
Local government borrowing and fiscal respon­
sibility frameworks. These frameworks are 
often weakly developed and poorly 
implemented. Some frameworks are highly 
restrictive, effectively precluding local 
government borrowing (e.g. Denmark, 
Chile, Kenya and Tunisia). Other 
frameworks are too lax, potentially allowing 
for the type of risky behavior that occurred 
in the 1990s in Brazil and Argentina. In a 
few case such as South Africa, robust 
frameworks that promote responsible 
borrowing have been developed. 
Access to credit. In many cases, especially in 
poor developing countries, local governments 
often have poor and unreliable access to credit. 
Financial markets are not well developed, and 
many local governments do not have credit 
histories or do not meet technical standards 
required by lenders. The situation is brighter in 
the short and medium term in emerging 
economies where financial markets tend to be 
more developed with the introduction of 
systems for disclosure, credit ratings, pricing 
benchmarks, and so forth. 
Special institutions. Special credit institutions 
that have been set up to lend to local 
governments (as is the case in more than 60 
countries, often with support from international 
organizations in developing countries) have 
rarely performed well. Their often disappointing 
results have been associated with the 
politicization of lending decisions and 
problematic design issues. Many of the 
intermediary institutions are not sufficiently 
independent from the government, and they 
are not allowed or have not attempted to link 
with domestic credit markets. In this regard, 
local governments are not supported in 
learning how to become familiar with and 
develop capacity to comply with market 
expectations regarding financial capacities, 
disclosures, provisioning, and so on. 
Central government practices. A number of 
central government practices, such as weak 
appraisal mechanisms for loans from 
government affiliated credit institutions, local 
government bailouts and automatic intercepts, 
have disrupted the normal development of local 
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credit markets. There has been a pervasive 
problem with approval by government 
associated lending mechanisms of inadequately 
vetted loans for non-viable projects. The 
practice of bailouts when local governments 
cannot or will not repay their loans undermines 
their fiscal discipline and distorts the credit 
market. Although reliance on automatic 
intercepts from transfers are generally 
associated with better repayment to special 
credit institutions and can help to develop 
access to credit, maintaining them for long 
periods without encouraging local government 
graduation to more market oriented sources 
can create poor incentives for local govern­
ments to properly consider and lenders to 
properly appraise local government projects. 
Links to the broader intergovernmental fiscal 
system. Other aspects of local government 
finance covered above are sometimes not 
conducive to borrowing. Borrowing can be 
curtailed if local governments have insufficient 
access to discretionary sources of revenue to 
make loan payments or if intergovernmental 
transfers undermine incentives for even 
relatively wealthy local governments to borrow, 
for self-financing development projects. 
Lack of appropriate financial management 
practices also undermines the ability of local 
governments to properly prepare development 
projects, qualify for credit, and manage their 
debt portfolios. 
Recommendations 
The findings of GOLD II clearly indicate that 
local governments around the world 
-from the most industrialized to the least 
developed countries- suffer from problems 
and challenges in their local government 
finance systems, and in some respects the 
situation has stagnated or worsened in recent 
years. In Africa local governments represent 
well under 10 percent of public expenditures 
and less of pubic revenue. MEWA countries also 
have limited resources and even more limited 
autonomy. In many countries in Latin America, 
Asia, Eurasia, and even in Europe, local govern­
ments lack legitimacy because they cannot 
meet important responsibilities with available 
resources. Although some needed actions will 
be difficult to quickly implement, there is much 
that can be done. 
Expenditure Assignment and Management 
A clear assignment of expenditure respon­
sibilities should be at the top of national 
reform agendas for local government 
finance. There are some important political 
economy issues noted throughout the 
report that often make this step difficult. 
Several basic measures need to be followed 
for this foundational reform that will in 
some cases require a revision of the 
legal framework and harmonization of 
decentralization and sector laws. 
Identify the exclusive responsibilities of 
local governments is needed to increase the 
clarity required for accountability. In cases 
where there is legal clarity and the 
assignments have not been implemented, 
action is needed to enforce the provisions of 
the legal framework. In cases where it is 
deemed necessary to have concurrent 
responsibilities for particular services, it is 
important to identify which level has specific 
responsibilities for various aspects — i. e. 
regulation, financing, and implementation. 
Limit higher controls on local expenditures. In 
the EU, for example, the Commission should 
not excessively control or interfere with local 
service delivery. In multi-tier systems the role 
played by intermediate tiers (states and 
provinces) in controlling local expenditures 
should be appropriate and restrained. There 
should be limited infringement on local 
autonomy, and with specifically local services, 
intermediate levels should not be interfering. In 
developing environments where there are 
significant differences in administrative 
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capacity across local governments, asymmetric 
assignment of responsibilities may be 
justified, at least temporarily. Over time local 
governments can graduate —with appropriate 
incentives and support— to more complete levels 
of responsibility as their capacity is developed. 
Determine financial requirements. For a clear 
assignment of expenditure responsibilities 
to become useful for other aspects of the 
local fiscal framework, they must be 
translated into expenditure needs/financing 
requirements through application of an 
appropriate standardized methodology. A 
systematic evaluation of the cost of transferred 
responsibilities should precede the transfers of 
task and resources. 
Fund all mandates. It is important to be explicit 
that the level of government with the power to 
regulate a function also has the obligation to pay 
for it. Increasing coordination and dialogue 
among levels of government regarding functional 
assignment is also needed, and there should be 
ex-ante review of all government legislation 
regarding local governments to detect any 
unfunded mandates. 
Ensure that human resources follow functions. 
Funding/staffing of deconcentrated offices of 
line ministries should be downscaled or 
eliminated. This will reflect the functions 
transferred to local governments and ensure 
that they have the staff to execute them, while 
at the same time reducing the existence of staff 
at other levels who might interfere with local 
government functions. 
Reduce and progressively eliminate ex ante 
control of local government budgets. In some 
developing environments this may not be 
possible to do quickly, but as the local finance 
system matures it is important to shift from 
an emphasis on ex ante control to an emphasis 
on ex post control, such as audits, and to a 
greater focus on developing accountability to 
the citizens. 
Implement expenditure decentralization stra­
tegically. It may be appropriate to use the type 
of asymmetry noted above, and both 
performance incentives and capacity building 
may be needed. Capacity building and technical 
assistance should support local governments to 
establish a foundation in the first stages of 
decentralization and then help them adapt to 
performance incentives in later stages. 
Local Revenue Generation and Autonomy 
Autonomous local revenue generation is the 
most serious fiscal challenge faced in a majority 
of countries globally. Althought the exact set of 
revenue reforms will vary across countries, this 
type of reform is to some extent needed in 
most countries. 
Increase reliance on own revenues with 
meaningful discretion. This strengthens the 
link between benefits and costs of local 
services, making local officials more 
accountable to taxpayers and more fiscally 
responsible. This can be done through 
reforms to existing sources of revenue and/or 
the addition of new sources, and appropiate 
systems and capacity must be developed in 
conjunction with expanded revenue authority. 
Reform and modernize property tax 
administration. Clearly the poor revenue 
performance of the property tax has a heavy 
administrative component. But there are 
political limits to using this source, so the 
nature and extent of reforms must be decided 
on a case-by-case basis. 
Diversify the local tax base. This is needed in 
many countries but reforms should target 
viable and productive local revenues (i.e. not 
nuisance taxes) as well as ensure that local 
economic activity will not be impeded. 
Only a limited number of local taxes meet these 
criteria, including vehicle taxes, business 
license taxes, piggyback income taxes and 
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betterment levies on real estate. Vehicle taxes 
can be based on registration, licensing, parking 
and similar bases. Business taxes can take 
different forms, but typically use sales turnover 
as a proxy for the tax base; care must be taken 
not to convert them into sales taxes that 
conflict with other consumption taxes, 
particularly national VAT. Going further in the 
direction of increasing local tax autonomy 
would be the introduction of a local piggy-back 
personal income tax with a flat rate collected at 
the same time as the national income tax is 
collected. Betterment levies are an important 
means for financing infrastructure investments 
in countries where they are used. All of these 
sources can be extremely productive, but they 
are most relevant for urban and intermediate-
level (states, provinces) governments. 
In addition to these more traditional resources, 
a potentially valuable but relatively unexploited 
source in most regions is environmental or 
"green" taxation related to waste management, 
water and air polluting activities, and the 
production of energy. Green taxes would 
provide a so-called "double dividend" since they 
promote both revenue generation and a cleaner 
environment. There are also opportunities to 
develop sources of revenue based on the 
increasingly important knowledge economy. 
There is often an opportunity to adapt the fiscal 
system to include some taxation on activities 
from the informal sector, particularly in de­
veloping countries. 
Increase freedom to raise fees and user charges. 
There are economic, technical, and political 
challenges and limitations associated with such 
revenues, but they could be more extensively 
used in most countries. Better and more explicit 
pricing for public services may help to improve 
efficiency if political obstacles to charges can be 
overcome. The principle of cost recovery on 
public services should be promoted where 
feasible, but in a way that does not undermine 
access to basic services by the poor. 
Carefully organize local tax collection 
responsibilities. The challenges of getting 
the right arrangements between central and 
local governments, as noted above, are 
considerable. With local collection, robust 
systems and incentives are needed for the 
potential benefits to be realized. When 
centralized administration of local taxes is 
appropriate, it is important to establish 
the right incentives for central tax 
administrations. Extensive dialogue and 
cooperation between different levels of tax 
administration is always desirable and should 
be institutionalized. This includes information 
sharing on collections with local governments 
and allowing their participation in some 
aspects of management. 
Engage local government officials more fully 
in mobilizing local resources, linking them to 
service delivery, and using them more 
transparently. Local officials must assume 
their responsibility to mobilize the local 
resources required to improve local service 
provision. The tax morale of local residents 
and their willingness to contribute to the local 
funds can be improved through campaigns of 
fiscal awareness that inform citizens about 
how resources are used and how decisions 
are made. Local officials should also ensure 
the transparent management of funds and 
encourage citizen participation in order to 
increase their confidence on the budget 
process. 
Intergovernmental Transfers 
Considerable challenges and weaknesses in 
intergovernmental transfer systems were 
outlined above. Multiple steps could commonly 
be taken to improve the structure and operation 
of intergovernmental transfer systems. 
Assure predicate, regular, and transparent 
transfer mechanisms. A legal framework should 
establish a minimum level of public resources 
that the central government must transfer every 
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year to local authorities and offer sufficient 
assurance that they will be allocated in a clear 
and fair manner. 
Secure an appropriate balance among the 
various types of transfers. There is no hard and 
fast rule about derivation based versus formula 
allocated tax sharing, although the former may 
worsen fiscal disparities, reinforcing the need 
for equalization (see below). Similarly, there 
is no normatively ideal balance between 
unconditional and conditional transfers. A 
significant share of unconditional funds hovever 
reinforces local government autonomy and 
accountability and it is the better option to 
support local autonomy and locally driven 
development when local governments have 
acquired minimum capacities. 
Expand and improve the use of equalization 
transfers. Countries that do not use them should 
consider doing so to offset the differential 
abilities of local governments to meet basic 
service needs. Countries that do use them 
should take stock of their approach and move 
towards a system that uses an explicit and stable 
rule to determine the pool of funds; takes 
expenditure needs and revenue capacity (as 
opposed to actual expenditures or revenues) 
into account when allocating funds; and allows 
unconditional use of transferred funds. In 
countries where elements of equalization are 
imbedded in revenue sharing, as is common in 
Latin America, it would be desirable, following 
the rule of using a single instrument for each 
objective, to unbundle those schemes and 
separately introduce an explicit equalization 
transfer with the properties listed above. 
Review and improve mechanisms used for 
allocating resources under conditional grants. 
Beyond the basic guidelines on equalization 
grants noted above, best practice for 
conditional grant systems calls for 
simplification, moving toward using fewer 
separate block grants with clear sectoral 
objectives and providing governments with 
sufficient flexibility for deciding on the best 
use of the funds while meeting the broader 
sectoral objectives defined by the upper level 
authorities. 
Consolidating grants where large numbers of 
poorly coordinated programs exist. In some 
countries in Europe and Asia, for example, 
there are too many grants that are not clearly 
distinguished and the resources could be 
more productively used in a more consolidated 
system. 
Local Government Borrowing and 
Investment Finance 
In many countries, there are considerable 
opportunities for increasing the use of borrowing 
and other investment finance mechanisms as 
well as expanding and improving sources of 
funding for this purpose. A number of specific 
policies and reforms can often support this goal. 
Promote local government borrowing. 
Borrowing is one of the necessary pillars of local 
finance. Responsible local borrowing, guided by 
prudent rules and regulations (a fiscal 
responsibility framework) should be allowed 
where feasible, in parallel to the strengthening 
of local capacities. 
Develop and strengthen legal and regulatory 
frameworks for local government borrowing. 
Rules regarding debt level and debt service 
ratios need not be overly restrictive, but 
central authorities need to enforce hard 
budget constraints and avoid bailouts. Central 
monitoring of local borrowing is critical, 
especially where private market discipline 
is not operational. Such monitoring should 
cover not only regular debt but also "floating 
debt" or budgetary arrears with official 
institutions and private suppliers, and local 
government guarantees for municipal 
enterprises. Monitoring should be complemented 
with a credible system of penalties for lack of 
compliance. 
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Expand and improve options and support me­
chanisms for local government borrowing, 
including support where appropriate to 
intermediate financial institutions or municipal 
development funds. Beyond the regulation and 
monitoring, an even more important challenge 
for most developing countries is to facilitate a 
significant increase in credit availability to local 
governments for responsible borrowing, es­
pecially for smaller municipalities. The solution 
may be the creation of official financial 
intermediaries or municipal lending institutions, 
such as Municipal Development Banks or 
Funds. International experience, however, 
suggests that they must focus on lending 
operations rather than get involved in other 
matters (such as technical assistance to local 
governments), should be operated following 
strict banking criteria (including project 
appraisal), and should increase the share of 
private capital in their pool of resources over 
time. Policies to encourage the development of 
private markets for local credit are equally 
important. The exact mix of these activities will 
depend on the context of a particular country 
following the general rule to use the market to 
the extent feasible and to use public or mixed 
lending mechanisms in a way that prepares 
local governments for eventual commercial 
borrowing. 
Reform other aspects of the local finance system 
as necessary to enhance the prospects for local 
government borrowing. Local governments 
must have access to and effectively use existing 
(and as needed additional) local taxes, user 
charges, and central government grants 
earmarked to local infrastructure. In addition, it 
is necessary to have good financial management 
practices in place. 
Consider other investment financing mechanisms 
where feasible. Tax increment financing, 
betterment levies (valorization), and public 
private partnerships can also provide necessary 
investment finance for local governments. These 
mechanisms, however, also require certain 
capacities and conditions and should not be seen 
as an easy alternative to borrowing. 
Determine an appropriate role in infrastructure 
finance for International Financial Institutions 
and other development agencies. These 
institutions have long played an important role 
in developing and some transition countries, 
and in many cases they will continue to do so 
for the foreseeable future. Such resources have 
traditionally flowed to central governments with 
onlending to local governments. Such 
onlending should comply with the basic 
principles outlined above, and there should be 
an increasing role for direct sub-sovereign 
lending, especially to larger cities in countries 
where this is feasible. 
Framing Institutional Reform 
The finance system reforms outlined above will 
need to be reinforced by other measures of a 
more institutional nature, most of which were 
discussed earlier in this chapter to set the stage 
for the discussion of fiscal decentralization. A 
number of key institutional issues often impact 
local finances and merit consideration. 
Assess and respond as necessary to local 
government jurisdictional fragmentation. 
Fragmentation is neither inherently desirable 
nor undesirable, but as discussed above it can 
create problems. There are two types of issues. 
The first is ensuring that any creation of new 
jurisdictions is done according to clear criteria to 
prevent the proliferation of non-viable entities. 
In some cases there are perverse incentives 
(e.g. in the transfer system) to create new 
jurisdictions. These should be avoided. 
The second is coping with existing frag­
mentation that is deemed to be problematic. 
Where politically feasible, consolidation of 
small, non-viable units may be considered, but 
this can undermine political connection and 
local accountability. An alternative policy is to 
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enable the creation of voluntary municipal 
partnerships to deliver public services requiring 
a minimum scale. Such associations and 
agreements can also help to address benefit 
spillovers across local government or the 
exporting of the costs of local services to 
neighboring jurisdictions by, for example, 
through agreements that provide for sharing 
service provision costs in accordance with 
benefits. Other solutions include voluntary 
jurisdictional consolidation, the creation of 
special districts to take advantage of economies 
of scale in selected services, or jointly 
contracting with private firms. 
Identify the right roles for and interactions 
between deconcentrated and devolved 
government entities. In cases where both 
deconcentrated and devolved entities coexist 
side by side, it should be made clear 
what functions each is responsible for, and 
they should respectively be provided with 
appropriate staff, funding, and capacity to meet 
their obligations. In countries where there has 
been heavy reliance on deconcentration alone, 
consideration could be given to introducing 
democratically elected local governments 
with devolved autonomy to prioritize their 
budgets in accordance with the expressed 
needs of local residents. It is important to 
note that there can be room for both 
deconcentrated and devolved levels in some 
cases, but the system must be set up to tap 
the advantages of each and prevent one type 
—usually deconcentrated administration— 
from undermining the other. 
Assess the appropriate role for and operations of 
external development assistance agencies and 
financial institutions in developing countries. As 
discussed earlier, there are two broad types of 
problems —the heavy handedness of external 
agents in promoting certain types of 
decentralization reforms, and their tendency to 
create parallel institutions and mechanisms for 
implementing their programs that at least 
partially bypass normal decision making and 
resource allocation procedures of local govern­
ments. The latter measure is generally intended 
to compensate for real and perceived problems, 
such as weak local government capacity, 
corruption, and ineffective and bureaucratic 
central government agencies. Parallel 
mechanisms can help to deliver services and may 
be appropriate in some form at early stages of 
decentralization when local governments are 
very weak, but ultimately they undermine the 
legitimacy and effectiveness of local govern­
ments. Neither of these donor approaches is 
consistent with current thinking on aid 
effectiveness, as reflected in the Paris Declaration 
on Aid Effectiveness (2005), Accra Agenda 
for Action (2008) and the upcoming Seoul 
High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (2011). 
The underlying philosophy highlights the 
harmonization of development assistance with 
national policy and stresses the importance of 
using national systems to deliver services, 
thereby reinforcing both national and 
subnational governments' capacity development 
and their accountability to citizens. 
Ensuring that external development partners 
follow national policies is ideally the role of the 
national government. In countries with weak 
capacity and significant need for assistance, 
however, this may be difficult. Under such 
circumstances, the development partners 
themselves need to take steps to ensure that 
they align with national priorities. 
Ideally parallel institutions should not be used. 
If it is necessary to use them for reasons noted 
above, they must be framed as temporary 
arrangements with a clear plan for phasing 
them out in favor of greater reliance on local 
mechanisms as they become institutionalized. 
When local mechanisms are sufficiently 
credible, external agencies should foresee 
budget support that empowers local decision 
making. 
International agencies need to ensure that 
budget support programs contribute to the 
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strengthening of local governments and the 
development of their autonomy. Likewise, 
sector-wide approaches are often a centralizing 
force in practice, but they can be instrumental 
in strengthening and implementing the specific 
local powers and responsibilities as defined in 
the legal frameworks for decentralization. 
Create a regular and systematic dialogue 
between local governments and the central 
government on intergovernmental and local 
financial policy. Although this has not been 
previously discussed in an extensive way, 
this report clearly leads to the conclusion 
that local governments in many countries are 
not sufficiently consulted on national 
policies of great consequence for them. 
Local governments could be consulted annually 
during the national budget process on all 
questions that directly or indirectly affect their 
financing. This would require a mechanism 
created to bring together the national actors 
(legislature and executive) and local govern­
ments. For such an approach to be effective, it 
would be important to ensure access to 
appropriate information on public finances, 
both in general and specifically regarding local 
government matters. 
The Way Forward 
Local governments have become more 
important and more autonomous in many 
countries around the world and higher 
expectations have been placed on them. 
Because this has happened in a challenging 
global environment of substantial urbanization, 
demographic shifts, climate change, and in­
creasing risk, more attention needs to be given 
to developing the basic fiscal architecture 
that serves as a foundation for good 
local government performance. As highlighted 
throughout the report, there has been good 
progress on many fronts in many countries, but 
there are still major deficiencies and challenges 
in most cases, both in terms of the elements of 
the fiscal system that need to be in place and 
the capacity of local governments to function 
effectively. Unless these are confronted head 
on, there are great dangers of social and 
economic decline in the more advanced 
economies and a failure to meet key in­
creasingly urgent needs in developing coun­
tries, including poverty reduction targets and 
the Millennium Development Goals. 
Although diversity is great across countries, 
there are some shared challenges common to 
many places. Clarity of functional assignment 
in law and practice is a challenge in many 
developing countries, and unfunded mandates 
are a more general problem. In many countries 
there is a pressing need to reassess the 
structure of local taxes, and the degree of 
autonomy that local governments have in 
defining and using them. In many cases it will be 
desirable to move beyond traditional local 
revenue bases, and to search for a more 
appropriate distribution of transferred and own-
source resources between national and local 
governments, as well as among subnational 
governments in the context of the emergence of 
new tiers and new units at particular levels. 
Growing investment requirements necessitate 
an expansion of local government access to 
capital, increasingly through market-oriented an 
non-traditional mechanisms. There is also a 
need for developing more innovative approaches 
to raising resources and delivering services, 
including through new and expanded forms of 
partnership with different actors (private sector 
and civil society). 
As countries around the world strive to improve 
their local government systems, they will have 
to keep in mind some daunting short-term and 
longer term challenges. The most immediate 
challenge is the global financial and economic 
crisis that started near the end of 2008, which 
has resulted in revenue shortfalls for many 
local governments and even attempts to 
recentralize in some cases. Countries also face 
longer term challenges that cut across all levels 
of government, some of which can have 
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particularly important implications for local 
governments because of the increasing role this 
government level plays in the provision of social 
services, environmental control, and so on. 
Some of these challenges are common (global 
warming, energy crisis, etc.) but others differ by 
region of the world. Rapidly increasing 
urbanization, for example, particularly in many 
of the developing countries of Africa, Asia, and 
Latin America, is creating complex demands on 
public services and infrastructure, yet local 
governments in many countries in these regions 
do not have the necessary authority and 
autonomy to meet these demands. In addition 
they too frequently cannot even cover the 
operating costs of existing services much 
less the costs of the substantial additional 
investments needed. 
Although many suggestions to improve local 
government finance systems have been made 
in the regional chapters and in this concluding 
chapter, in closing this volume it is important to 
reiterate again a few fundamental points 
regarding the approach to reform. 
First, each country is unique and the basic 
principles for reform need to be tailored to the 
economic, political, fiscal, and social realities of 
individual countries. In Europe, for example, 
substantial capacity exists, but there is a need 
for system reforms and increased access to 
investment finance. At the other end of the 
spectrum, less developed countries in several 
regions need to build basic institutions 
gradually if reforms are to take root and be 
sustained, although more capacity may exist in 
larger cities for more immediate assumption of 
functions and resources. 
Second, consultation and collaboration among 
levels of government and other actors will be 
critical as efforts to strengthen local finance 
systems advance —each actor has an 
important role, but no actor alone can do what 
needs to be done. In particular, central 
governments need to treat local governments 
as partners, with full consultation in all issues 
of shared responsibilities. Local governments 
also need to continue the efforts they are 
already pursuing in many countries to reach 
out to citizens, to develop partnerships with 
non-governmental organizations and private 
firms, and to seek innovative means to deal 
with the challenges they face. 
Third, while political factors are critical and there 
is no point in pursuing reforms that are 
politically infeasible, it is also important to 
make decisions about reform based on 
good information and evidence, the lack of 
which created considerable challenges for the 
preparation of this report. Better information 
and analysis and broader and more transparent 
dissemination of such inputs can create and 
nurture a better environment for pursuing the 
right reforms over time. In addition, the success 
of initial modest reforms can create political mo­
mentum for the adoption of more advanced 
reforms with greater impact over time. 
Finally, there is considerable value added from 
regional and global cooperation, sharing 
experiences, and learning by doing in pursuing 
local finance reform. The role of UCLG, its 
regional member organizations, and their 
individual country members, provides a strong 
foundation for collaborative learning at various 
levels, and these actors need to continue to 
strengthen those links going forward. 
Global and regional events, online access to 
information, country specific, regional and 
global networking activities, diagnostics to help 
countries and local governments to plan 
concrete productive action, and forums and 
mechanisms for sharing experiences and 
expertise would all be productive ways to 
support better local government finance. 
Some opportunities in these areas already 
exist, but much remains to be done to 
consolidate and improve knowledge about 
them, enhance access to them, and deepen 
an understanding among all stakeholders of 
how to effectively use them. 
